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Abstract
Both violence and international norms on human rights have become globalized. Formerly
rigid systems of sovereignty become porous as the enemies and the friends of the rule of law show
equal and opposite disregard for State boundaries. Judges in national courts are obliged to put
aside their usual textbooks and cases, and open their eyes to legal scholars and commentators like
Brownlie and Cassese. Four cases in the ten-year history of South Africa’s Constitutional Court
have exemplified these points. In each the Court was under pressure because of time–in three
because events were unfolding so rapidly, and in one because the proceedings had dragged on for
so long. All were about the law’s response to extreme forms of organized violence. In Azanian
Peoples Organisation (“AZAPO”) v. President of The Republic of South Africa, the violence
was by past State officials against their own citizens, and the issue was whether in the light of
international law norms, amnesty could now be granted to the perpetrators. In State v. Basson,
the charge was past violence by South African official against nationals of a neighboring country,
and the question raised was whether the international duty of the State to prosecute war crimes
had a bearing on the decisions made at the trial and on appeal. In Mohamed v. President of the
Republic of South Africa, the violence had been committed against the U.S. embassy in Tanzania,
and the issue was whether a suspect found on South African soil could be handed over to the
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) without access to a lawyer, and without the U.S.
authorities giving a prior assurance that the suspect would not be subjected to capital punishment.
Finally, Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa, turned on whether South African
mercenaries, who had been captured in a neighboring State and threatened with prosecution and
capital punishment after an unfair trial in a third State, could claim the right to be extradited back
to South Africa and to get diplomatic protection from the South African authorities. I will deal
with each case in turn, and do so in a narrative rather than analytical manner. The objective is
not to subject the reasoning of the Court to close scrutiny–that will be left to others who were not
directly involved in the matters. The purpose is limited to indicating the kinds of international law
issues with which a contemporary national court has been engaged. In particular, the extracts from
our judgments which appear in the following pages demonstrate the evolution of an intricate and
restless interpenetration between international and domestic law that is likely to grow in the years
to come.

WAR, VIOLENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
THE OVERLAP BETWEEN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FOUR CASES
BEFORE THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Albie Sachs
National courts as a general rule are not comfortable with
international law. The two systems use similar language and
concepts, but operate within different matrices. Yet there are
times when the overlap between national and international law
becomes unavoidable. Both violence and international norms
on human rights have become globalized. Formerly rigid systems of sovereignty become porous as the enemies and the
friends of the rule of law show equal and opposite disregard for
State boundaries. Judges in national courts are obliged to put
aside their usual textbooks and cases, and open their eyes to legal scholars and commentators like Brownlie and Cassese.'
Four cases in the ten-year history of South Africa's Constitutional Court have exemplified these points.2 They all dealt with
matters of great human drama. In each the Court was under
pressure because of time - in three because events were unfolding so rapidly, 3 and in one because the proceedings had
dragged on for so long.4 All were about the law's response to
extreme forms of organized violence.
In Azanian Peoples Organisation("AZAPO") v. President of The
Republic of South Africa,5 the violence was by past State officials
against their own citizens, and the issue was whether in the light
of international law norms, amnesty could now be granted to the
perpetrators.6 In State v. Basson,7 the charge was past violence by
1. See infra notes 62, 117 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 13, 75, and 96 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
5. Azanian Peoples Organisation ("AZAPO") v. President of the Republic of S.
Ar., 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/azapo/
azapo.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
6. See infra notes 13-35 and accompanying text.
7. State v. Basson, 2004 (6) BCLR 620 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.
gov.za/files/CCT3003/CCT3003.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
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a South African official against nationals of a neighboring country, and the question raised was whether the international duty
of the State to prosecute war crimes had a bearing on the decisions made at the trial and on appeal.' In Mohamed v. President of
the Republic of South Africa,9 the violence had been committed
against the U.S. embassy in Tanzania, and the issue was whether
a suspect found on South African soil could be handed over to
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") without access
to a lawyer, and without the U.S. authorities giving a prior assurance that the suspect would not be subjected to capital punishment.1" Finally, Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Af
rica," turned on whether South African mercenaries, who had
been captured in a neighboring State and threatened with prosecution and capital punishment after an unfair trial in a third
State, could claim the right to be extradited back to South Africa
and to get diplomatic protection from the South African authorities.

12

I will deal with each case in turn, and do so in a narrative
rather than analytical manner. The objective is not to subject
the reasoning of the Court to close scrutiny - that will be left to
others who were not directly involved in the matters. The purpose is limited to indicating the kinds of international law issues
with which a contemporary national court has been engaged. In
particular, the extracts from our judgments which appear in the
following pages demonstrate the evolution of an intricate and
restless interpenetration between international and domestic law
that is likely to grow in the years to come.
I. AZAPO
When reading draftjudgments of my colleagues for the first
time, I am frequently filled with admiration by the elegant way in
which they express important legal thoughts. We are a new
Court creating a new jurisprudence with the aid of a new and
8. See infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text.
9. Mohamed v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 2001 (7) BCLR 685 (CC),
available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/mohamed/mohamed.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005).
10. See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
11. Kaunda v. President of Republic of S. Afr., 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files//kaunda.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
12. See infra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
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highly respected Constitution. All of my colleagues have had
their imaginations honed and their pens sharpened in the hard
struggle to achieve justice in our country. But only once have I
jumped out of my seat and rushed to my colleague's Chambers
to communicate my enthusiasm. Ismail Mahomed, then Deputy
President of the Constitutional Court, and later Chief Justice of
South Africa, looked up at me startled and embarrassed. In a
case that produced deep emotion throughout the country as
well as in the Court, he had found exquisite language to capture
both the gravity of profound human issues and the delicacy of
the competing considerations. In words of rare sensibility he established the historic setting of transformation in which the
Court was created. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission has aroused considerable international interest.
Nowhere has its reason for being been better captured than in
the AZAPO13 judgment:
For decades South African history has been dominated
by a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself
all control over the political instruments of the [S] tate and a
majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental
human rights became a major casualty of this conflict as the
resistance of those punished by their denial was met by laws
designed to counter the effectiveness of such resistance. The
conflict deepened with the increased sophistication of the
economy, the rapid acceleration of knowledge and education
and the ever increasing hostility of an international community steadily outraged by the inconsistency which had become
manifest between its own articulated ideals after the Second
World War and the official practices which had become institutionalised in South Africa through laws enacted to give
them sanction and teeth by a Parliament elected only by a
privileged minority. The result was a debilitating war of internal political dissension and confrontation, massive expressions of labour militancy, perennial student unrest, punishing
international economic isolation, widespread dislocation in
crucial areas of national endeavour, accelerated levels of
armed conflict and a dangerous combination of anxiety, frustration and anger among expanding proportions of the populace. The legitimacy of law itself was deeply wounded as the
13. Azanian Peoples Organisation ("AZAPO") v. President of the Republic of S.
Mr., 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC).
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country haemorrhaged dangerously in the face of this tragic
conflict which had begun to traumatise the entire (N]ation.
During the eighties it became manifest to all that our
country with all its natural wealth, physical beauty and human
resources was on a disaster course unless that conflict was reversed. It was this realisation which mercifully rescued us in
the early nineties as those who controlled the levers of [S] tate
power began to negotiate a different future with those who
had been imprisoned, silenced, or driven into exile in consequence of their resistance to that control and its consequences. Those negotiations resulted in an interim Constitution 4 committed to a transition towards a more just, defensible and democratic political order based on the protection of
fundamental human rights. It was wisely appreciated by those
involved in the preceding negotiations that the task of building such a new democratic order was a very difficult task because of the previous history and the deep emotions and indefensible inequities it had generated; and that this could not
be achieved without a firm and generous commitment to reconciliation and national unity. It was realised that much of
the unjust consequences of the past could not ever be fully
reversed. It might be necessary in crucial areas to close the
book on that past.
This fundamental philosophy is eloquently expressed in
the epilogue to the Constitution which reads as follows:
"National Unity and Reconciliation
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice,
and a future founded on the recognition of human
rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of
all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the
reconstruction of society.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to
transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which
14.

S. AFR., Acr 200 OF 1993 [hereinafter INTERIM
The judgment thereafter refers to the Interim Constitution simply as "the
Constitution."
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF

CONST.I.
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generated gross violations of human rights, the
transgression of humanitarian principles in violent
conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that
there is a need for understanding but not for ven-

geance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation,
a need for ubuntu15 but not for victimisation.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of
acts, omissions and offences associated with political
objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this
Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm
cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October
1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing
for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty
shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been
passed.
With this Constitution and these commitments
we, the people of South Africa, open a new chapter
in the history of our country."
Pursuant to the provisions of the epilogue, Parliament enacted during 1995 what is colloquially referred to as the
15. The term ubuntu is not defined in the South African Constitution. See State v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665, 223 (CC). Ubuntu is an African cultural value that
is difficult to define precisely. Desmond Tutu said ubuntu "speaks about the essence of
being human: that my humanity is caught up in your humanity because we say a person
is a person through other persons .. .forgiveness is absolutely necessary for continued
human existence." Lorna McGregor, Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural
Optimism or Political Farade?,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 32, 38 (2001) (quoting Desmond Tutu,
Without Forgiveness There Is No Future, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS Xiii(Robert Enright &
Joanna North eds., 1998). In Makwanyane, Justice Langa explained that "an outstanding feature of ubuntu in a community sense is the value it puts on life and human
dignity. The dominant theme of the culture is that the life of another person is at least
as valuable as one's own. Respect for the dignity of every person is integral to the
225. Ubuntu has been described as an
concept." Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665,
African world-view and "a philosophy of life, which in its most fundamental sense represents personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality; a metaphor that describes
group solidarity where such group solidarity is central to the survival of communities
with a scarcity of resources." Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, 4 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 15 (1998). In Makwanyane, Justice Madala stated that
the reformative theory of justice, wherein punishment is a means to rehabilitating
criminals, "accords fully with ubuntu," in contrast to the death penalty. Makwanyane,
1995 (6) BCLR 665,
242-43.
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Truth and Reconciliation

16

Act.

17

The judgment provided a summary of AZAPO's claim that a
specific section of the Truth and Reconciliation Act ("the Act")
was not compatible with the Interim Constitution ("the Constitution"):
The applicants sought in this court to attack the constitutionality of section 20(7) on the grounds that its consequences are not authorised by the Constitution. They aver
that various agents of the [S] tate, acting within the scope and
in the course of their employment, have unlawfully murdered
and maimed leading activists during the conflict against the
racial policies of the previous administration and that the applicants have a clear right to insist that such wrongdoers
should properly be prosecuted and punished, that they
should be ordered by the ordinary courts of the land to pay
adequate civil compensation to the victims or dependants of
the victims and further to require the [S] tate to make good to
such victims or dependants the serious losses which they have
suffered in consequence of the criminal and delictual acts of
the employees of the [S]tate ....
[AZAPO] contended that
Section 20(7) was inconsistent with Section 22"9 of the Constitution which provides that: "[e]very person shall have the
right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or,
where appropriate, another independent or impartial forum."20

Justice Mohamed then observed that providing an amnesty
to the perpetrators of crimes would necessarily impact upon the
victims' fundamental rights:
All persons are entitled to the protection of the law against
unlawful invasions of their right to life, their right to respect
for and protection of dignity and their right not to be subject
to torture of any kind. When those rights are invaded those
aggrieved by such invasion have the right to obtain redress in
the ordinary courts of law and those guilty of perpetrating
16. Its proper name is the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34
of 1995. See The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, No. 24
(1995) [hereinafter "Truth and Reconciliation Act"].
17. Azanian Peoples Organisation ("AZAPO") v. President of the Republic of S.
Afr., 1996 (8) BCLR 1015,
1-3 (CC).
18. Truth and Reconciliation Act § 20(7).
19. INTERIM CONST. ch. 3, § 22.
20. AZAPO, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015, 8.
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such violations are answerable before such courts, both civilly
and criminally. An amnesty to the wrongdoer effectively obliterates such rights.
There would therefore be very considerable force in the
submission that [the impugned section of the Truth and Reconciliation Act] constitutes a violation of section 22 of the
Constitution, if there was nothing in the Constitution itself
which permitted or authorised such violation. The crucial issue, therefore, which needs to be determined, is whether the
Constitution, indeed, permits such a course....
I understand perfectly why the applicants would want to
insist that those wrongdoers who abused their authority and
wrongfully murdered, maimed or tortured very much loved
members of their families who had, in their view, been engaged in a noble struggle to confront the inhumanity of
apartheid, should vigorously be prosecuted and effectively be
punished for their callous and inhuman conduct in violation
of the criminal law. I can therefore also understand why they
are emotionally unable to identify themselves with the consequences of the legal concession made by [their counsel] ....
Every decent human being must feel grave discomfort in
living with a consequence which might allow the perpetrators
of evil acts to walk the streets of this land with impunity, protected in their freedom by an amnesty immune from constitutional attack, but the circumstances in support of this course
require carefully to be appreciated. Most of the acts of brutality and torture which have taken place have occurred during
an era in which neither the laws which permitted the incarceration of persons or the investigation of crimes, nor the
methods and the culture which informed such investigations,
were easily open to public investigation, verification and correction. Much of what transpired in this shameful period is
shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared, sometimes mysteriously and most of them no longer survive to tell
their tales. Others have had their freedom invaded, their dignity assaulted or their reputations tarnished by grossly unfair
imputations hurled in the fire and the cross-fire of a deep and
wounding conflict. The wicked and the innocent have often
both been victims. Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history.
Records are not easily accessible, witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effec-
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tively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved
ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to
the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could
survive the rigours of the law. The [Truth and Reconciliation
Act] seeks to address this massive problem by encouraging
these survivors and the dependants of the tortured and the
wounded, the maimed and the dead to unburden their grief
publicly, to receive the collective recognition of a new
[N]ation that they were wronged, and crucially, to help them
to discover what did in truth happen to their loved ones,
where and under what circumstances it did happen, and who
was responsible. That truth, which the victims of repression
seek so desperately to know is, in the circumstances, much
more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for such
monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to disclose the whole
truth with the incentive that they will not receive the punishment which they undoubtedly deserve if they do. Without
that incentive there is nothing to encourage such persons to
make the disclosures and to reveal the truth which persons in
the positions of the applicants so desperately desire. With
that incentive, what might unfold are objectives fundamental
to the ethos of a new constitutional order. The families of
those unlawfully tortured, maimed or traumatised become
more empowered to discover the truth, the perpetrators become exposed to opportunities to obtain relief from the burden of a guilt or an anxiety they might be living with for many
long years, the country begins the long and necessary process
of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and
grief into a mature understanding and creating the emotional and structural climate essential for the "reconciliation
and reconstruction" which informs the very difficult and
sometimes painful objectives of the amnesty articulated in the
21
epilogue.
The idea of healing the wounds of the past frames the argument for amnesty in terms of restorative justice. 2 2 Restorative
justice seeks to remedy harm and injury through reparation and
reconciliation that can lead to social progress.2 3 Arguably, however, the families devastated by the crimes committed through21. Id. 1 9-10, 16-17.
22. See Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 411-12 (1999).
23. See id. at 412.
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out the apartheid era will want more than a new social order:
they will want the perpetrators of these horrors to be punished.24
But those seeking a remedy should not limit their understanding of South Africa's method of granting amnesty to the
idea that restorative justice must work alone if the Nation wishes
to recover and move forward. 25 Retributive justice works in
South Africa's amnesty scheme in that the immunity proceedings parallel one scenario typical of traditional criminal justice
someone comes forward, confesses to a crime, and then arranges a plea bargain.26 In South Africa's particularized amnesty
program, in order to receive immunity, the perpetrator must
first step forward and confess the crime, allowing the victim
and/or his or her family to hear the truth.2 7 If the perpetrator

does not confess, or tries to evade detection, if caught he or she
28
will still face criminal prosecution and liability.
Knowing that punishment in the traditional sense of criminal law will only come into play in the absence of a confession
may leave victims and their families with lingering dissatisfaction
in the amnesty system. Justice Mohamed goes on, however, to
explain why amnesty is the best and most workable alternative:
The alternative to the grant of immunity from criminal
prosecution of offenders is to keep intact the abstract right to
such a prosecution for particular persons without the evidence to sustain the prosecution successfully, to continue to
keep the dependants of such victims in many cases substantially ignorant about what precisely happened to their loved
ones, to leave their yearning for the truth effectively unassuaged, to perpetuate their legitimate sense of resentment
and grief and correspondingly to allow the culprits of such
deeds to remain perhaps physically free but inhibited in their
24. See id. at 403 (quoting Churchill Mxenge, a brother of a murdered antiapartheid attorney, as saying "unless justice is done, it is difficult for any person to think
of forgiving"); see also id. at 422 (referring to Mxenge's critique that "without public
punishment of the perpetrator, there will be no reconciliation between the victim's
family and the [S]tate").
25. See id. at 436 (outlining the role of retributivism in South Africa's particularized amnesty).
26. See id. at 436-37.
27. See id. at 437; see also infra note 33 and accompanying text. "The Amnesty Committee may grant amnesty in respect of the relevant offence only if the perpetrator of
the misdeed makes a full disclosure of all relevant facts." Azanian Peoples Organisation
("AZAPO") v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 1996 (8) BCLR 1015,
20 (CC).
28. See Markel, supra note 22, at 437.
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capacity to become active, full and creative members of the
new order by a menacing combination of confused fear, guilt,
uncertainty and sometimes even trepidation. Both the victims and the culprits who walk on the "historic bridge" described by the epilogue will hobble more than walk to the
future with heavy and dragged steps delaying and impeding a
rapid and enthusiastic transition to the new society at the end
of the bridge, which is the vision which informs the epilogue.
Even more crucially, but for a mechanism providing for
amnesty, the "historic bridge" itself might never have been
erected. For a successfully negotiated transition, the terms of
the transition required not only the agreement of those victimized by abuse but also those threatened by the transition
29
to a "democratic society based on freedom and equality". If
the Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous retaliation and revenge, the agreement of those threatened by its
implementation might never have been forthcoming, and if it
had, the bridge itself would have remained wobbly and insecure, threatened by fear from some and anger from others. It
was for this reason that those who negotiated the Constitution made a deliberate choice, preferring understanding over
vengeance, reparation over retaliation, ubuntu30 over victimisation.
Is [the impugned section], to the extent to which it immunizes wrongdoers from criminal prosecution, nevertheless
objectionable on the grounds that amnesty might be provided in circumstances where the victims, or the dependants
of the victims, have not had the compensatory benefit of discovering the truth at last or in circumstances where those
whose misdeeds are so obscenely excessive as to justify punishment, even if they were perpetrated with a political objective during the course of conflict in the past? Some answers
to such difficulties are provided [elsewhere in the Act]. The
Amnesty Committee may grant amnesty in respect of the relevant offence only if the perpetrator of the misdeed makes a
full disclosure of all relevant facts. If the offender does not,
and in consequence thereof the victim or his or her family is
not able to discover the truth, the application for amnesty will
fail. Moreover, it will not suffice for the offender merely to
say that his or her act was associated with a political objective.
That issue must independently be determined by the Am29. INTERIM CONST. §§ 33(1) (a) (ii) & 35(1).
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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nesty Committee pursuant to the criteria set out in [another
section of the Act] including the relationship between the offence committed and the political objective pursued and the
directness and proximity of the relationship and the proportionality of the offence to the objective pursued.
The result, at all levels, is a difficult, sensitive, perhaps
even agonising, balancing act between the need for justice to
victims of past abuse and the need for reconciliation and
rapid transition to a new future; between encouragement to
wrongdoers to help in the discovery of the truth and the need
for reparations for the victims of that truth; between a correction in the old and the creation of the new. It is an exercise
of immense difficulty interacting in a vast network of political,
emotional, ethical and logistical considerations. It is an act
calling for ajudgment falling substantially within the domain
of those entrusted with lawmaking in the era preceding and
during the transition period. The results may well often be
imperfect and the pursuit of the act might inherently support
the message of Kant that "out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made."3 ' There can be legitimate debate about the methods and the mechanisms chosen by the lawmaker to give effect to the difficult duty entrusted upon it in terms of the epilogue. We are not
concerned with that debate or the wisdom of its choice of
mechanisms but only with its constitutionality. That, for us, is
the only relevant standard. Applying that standard, I am not
satisfied that in providing for amnesty for those guilty of serious offences associated with political objectives and in defining the mechanisms through which and the manner in which
such amnesty may be secured by such offenders, the
lawmaker, in [the impugned section], has offended any of
the express or implied limitations on its powers in terms of
the Constitution.
South Africa is not alone in being confronted with a historical situation which required amnesty for criminal acts to
be accorded for the purposes of facilitating the transition to,
and consolidation of, an overtaking democratic order. Chile,
Argentina and El Salvador are among the countries which
have in modem times been confronted with a similar need.
Although the mechanisms adopted to facilitate that process
have differed from country to country and from time to time,
31. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
(paraphrasing Immanuel Kant).

FOUR

ESSAYS

ON LIBERTY

170 (1969)
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the principle that amnesty should, in appropriate circumstances, be accorded to violators of human rights in order to
facilitate the consolidation of new democracies was accepted
in all these countries and truth commissions were also established in such countries.
What emerges from the experience of these and other
countries that have ended periods of authoritarian and abusive rule, is that there is no single or uniform international
practice in relation to amnesty. Decisions of [S] tates in transition, taken with a view to assisting such transition, are quite
different from acts of a [S]tate covering up its own crimes by
granting itself immunity. In the former case, it is not a question of the governmental agents responsible for the violations
indemnifying themselves, but rather, one of a constitutional
compact being entered into by all sides, with former victims
being well-represented, as part of an ongoing process to develop constitutional democracy and prevent a repetition of
the abuses.
The need for this distinction is obvious. It is one thing to
allow the officers of a hostile power which has invaded a foreign [S]tate to remain unpunished for gross violations of
human rights perpetrated against others during the course of
such conflict. It is another thing to compel such punishment
in circumstances where such violations have substantially occurred in consequence of conflict between different formations within the same [S]ltate in respect of the permissible political direction which that [S]tate should take with regard to
the structures of the [S] tate and the parameters of its political
policies and where it becomes necessary after the cessation of
such conflict for the society traumatised by such a conflict to
reconstruct itself. The erstwhile adversaries of such a conflict
inhabit the same sovereign territory. They have to live with
each other and work with each other and the [S]tate concerned is best equipped to determine what measures may be
most conducive for the facilitation of such reconciliation and
reconstruction. That is a difficult exercise which the
[N]ation within such a [S]tate has to perform by having regard to its own peculiar history, its complexities, even its contradictions and its emotional and institutional traditions.
What role punishment should play in respect of erstwhile acts
of criminality in such a situation is part of the complexity....
The agonies of a [N]ation seeking to reconcile the tensions
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between justice for those wronged during conflict, on the one
hand, and the consolidation of the transition to a nascent democracy, on the other, has also been appreciated by other
international commentators....
...The amnesty contemplated is not a blanket amnesty
against criminal prosecution for all and sundry, granted automatically as a uniform act of compulsory statutory amnesia. It
is specifically authorised for the purposes of effecting a constructive transition towards a democratic order. It is available
only where there is a full disclosure of all facts to the Amnesty
Committee and where it is clear that the particular transgression was perpetrated during the prescribed period and with a
political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of
the past. That objective has to be evaluated having regard to
the careful criteria listed in section 20(3) of the Act, including the very important relationship which the act perpetrated
bears in proportion to the object pursued." 2
The next issue was whether the amnesty as contemplated by
the Constitution should be read as extending to liability by the
perpetrators to pay civil damages to the victims, as well as the
vicarious responsibility of the State to compensate victims of violence and torture inflicted by State officials. The judgment
stated that as far as the former was concerned, one of the main
objectives of the epilogue was to encourage perpetrators to
come forward and reveal the truth, and this would be frustrated
if they were to be held liable for civil damages. In relation to
civil liability by the State for criminal conduct by its officials during the previous era, the Court observed:
The families of those whose fundamental human rights
were invaded by torture and abuse are not the only victims
who have endured "untold suffering and injustice" in consequence of the crass inhumanity of apartheid which so many
have had to endure for so long. Generations of children
born and yet to be born will suffer the consequences of poverty, of malnutrition, of homelessness, of illiteracy and disempowerment generated and sustained by the institutions of
apartheid and its manifest effects on life and living for so
many. The country has neither the resources nor the skills to
reverse fully these massive wrongs. It will take many years of
strong commitment, sensitivity and labour to "reconstruct our
32. Azanian Peoples Organisation ("AZAPO") v. President of the Republic of S.
Mr., 1996 (8) BCLR 1015,
18-22, 24, 31-32 (CC) (some citations omitted).
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society" so as to fulfill the legitimate dreams of new generations exposed to real opportunities for advancement denied
to preceding generations initially by the execution of
apartheid itself and for a long time after its formal demise, by
its relentless consequences. The resources of the IS] tate have
to be deployed imaginatively, wisely, efficiently and equitably,
to facilitate the reconstruction process in a manner which
best brings relief and hope to the widest sections of the community, developing for the benefit of the entire [NIation the
latent human potential and resources of every person who
has directly or indirectly been burdened with the heritage of
the shame and the pain of our racist past.
Those negotiators of the Constitution and leaders of the
[N]ation who were required to address themselves to these
agonising problems must have been compelled to make hard
choices. They could have chosen to direct that the limited
resources of the [S]tate be spent by giving preference to the
formidable delictual claims of those who had suffered from
acts of murder, torture or assault perpetrated by servants of
the [S] tate, diverting to that extent, desperately needed funds
in the crucial areas of education, housing and primary health
care. They were entitled to permit a different choice to be
made between competing demands inherent in the problem.
They could have chosen to direct that the potential liability of
the [S]tate be limited in respect of any civil claims by differentiating between those against whom prescription could
have been pleaded as a defence and those whose claims were
of such recent origin that a defence of prescription would
have failed. They were entitled to reject such a choice on the
grounds that it was irrational. They could have chosen to saddle the [S] tate with liability for claims made by insurance
companies which had compensated institutions for delictual
acts performed by the servants of the [S] tate and to that extent again divert funds otherwise desperately needed to provide food for the hungry, roofs for the homeless and black
boards and desks for those struggling to obtain admission to
desperately overcrowded schools. They were entitled to permit the claims of such school children and the poor and the
homeless to be preferred.
The election made by the makers of the Constitution was
to permit Parliament to favour "the reconstruction of society"
involving in the process a wider concept of "reparation",
which would allow the [S] tate to take into account the competing claims on its resources but, at the same time, to have
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regard to the "untold suffering" of individuals and families
whose fundamental human rights had been invaded during
the conflict of the past. In some cases such a family may best
be assisted by a reparation which allows the young in this family to maximise their potential through bursaries and scholarships; in other cases the most effective reparation might take
the form of occupational training and rehabilitation; in still
other cases complex surgical interventions and medical help
may be facilitated; still others might need subsidies to prevent
eviction from homes they can no longer maintain and in suitable cases the deep grief of the traumatised may most effectively be assuaged by facilitating the erection of a tombstone
on the grave of a departed one with a public acknowledgement of his or her valour and nobility. There might have to
be differentiation between the form and quality of the reparations made to two persons who have suffered exactly the same
damage in consequence of the same unlawful act but where
one person now enjoys lucrative employment from the
[S] tate and the other lives in penury.
All these examples illustrate, in my view, that it is much
too simplistic to say that the objectives of the Constitution
could only properly be achieved by saddling the [S] tate with
the formal liability to pay, in full, the provable delictual
claims of those who have suffered patrimonial loss in consequence of the delicts perpetrated with political objectives by
servants of the [S] tate during the conflicts of the past. There
was a permissible alternative, perhaps even a more imaginative and more fundamental route to the "reconstruction of
society", which could legitimately have been followed. This is
the route which appears to have been chosen by Parliament
through the mechanism of amnesty and nuanced and individualised reparations in the Act. I am quite unpersuaded
that this is not a route authorised by the epilogue to the Constitution.
The judgment went on to point out that the legislation did
provide for reparations to be paid, even though not necessarily
on the scale that civil damages would be awarded through litiga34
tion:
33. Id. 1 43-46.
34. See JOHN DuCRI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECrIVE 62-64
(2d ed. 2000). The AZAPOjudgment has not escaped criticism. While all commentators express admiration for its eloquence and sensibility, and although there is not
much challenge to the outcome, some have criticized the manner in which the judg-
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In the result, I am satisfied that the epilogue to the Constitution authorised and contemplated an "amnesty" in its
most comprehensive and generous meaning so as to enhance
and optimise the prospects of facilitating the constitutional
journey from the shame of the past to the promise of the future. Parliament was, therefore, entitled to enact the Act in
the terms which it did. This involved more choices apart
from the choices I have previously identified. They could
have chosen to insist that a comprehensive amnesty manifestly involved an inequality of sacrifice between the victims
and the perpetrators of invasions into the fundamental rights
of such victims and their families, and that, for this reason,
the terms of the amnesty should leave intact the claims which
some of these victims might have been able to pursue against
those responsible for authorising, permitting or colluding in
such acts, or they could have decided that this course would
impede the pace, effectiveness and objectives of the transition
with consequences substantially prejudicial for the people of
a country facing, for the first time, the real prospect of enjoying, in the future, some of the human rights so unfairly
denied to the generations which preceded them. They were
entitled to choose the second course. They could conceivably
have chosen to differentiate between the wrongful acts committed in defence of the old order and those committed in
the resistance of it, or they could have chosen a comprehensive form of amnesty which did not make this distinction.
Again they were entitled to make the latter choice. The
choice of alternatives legitimately fell within the judgment of
the lawmakers. The exercise of that choice does not, in my
view, impact on its constitutionality. It follows from these reasons that [the impugned] section is authorised by the Constitution itself ....

Eight years have passed since this judgment was delivered.
ment deals with international law, including its technical treatment of State obligations
under the Geneva Conventions. As I understand it, the critique runs as follows: the
judgment indicates that if there is a conflict between the principles of international law
and the Constitution, then the Constitution must prevail. The proper approach, is that
the Constitution itself must be interpreted in the light of South Africa's international
law obligations. Only if there is no way in which the Constitution can be read so as to
be compatible with such obligations can it be said that the Constitution must prevail
over international law. Thus, the doyen of South African teachers and practitioners of
international law, Professor John Dugard, stated that while the judgment was probably
correct in its conclusion, it had misappreciated the manner in which the Constitution
itself was to be interpreted in the light of international law. See id.
35. AZAPO, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015,
50.
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Wherever I address legal audiences, in any part of the world, I
am bombarded with questions about South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Invariably I refer them to the remarkable AZAPOjudgment with which I felt honored to be associated.
II. BASSON
At the time of writing, the Basson3 6 case is still proceeding.
An unusually long period of six days has been set down for oral
argument. One of the major issues is whether or not international law imposes a duty on States to prosecute war crimes, and
if so, whether such duty has constitutional significance in relation to the criminal proceedings undertaken against the accused
in this matter.3 7
Several years ago the State indicted Dr. Wouter Basson on
sixty-four charges. 3 They all arose out of his role as a medical
scientist allegedly involved with counter-insurgency operations
by the South African State during the apartheid era. 9 Many of
the charges related to alleged misappropriation of funds given
to him for the conduct of secret operations.4" Others alleged
that he had developed toxic chemical and bacterial agents for
purposes of eliminating opponents of the South African government in neighboring countries. 4 ' The trial judge acquitted Dr.
Basson on all the charges relating to misappropriation of
funds.4 2 The State then alleged that the judge had shown bias
against the State and that the judge should have recused himself.4 3 The charges relating to chemical and bacterial elimination of opponents beyond South Africa's borders were incorporated in allegations of conspiracies undertaken on South African
36.
37.
38.
39.

State v. Basson, 2004 (6) BCLR 620 (CC).
See id.
16.
See id. 2.
See, e.g., STEPHEN BURGESS & HELEN PuRrr,

THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA'S

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM (2001), available at www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/southafrica.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005); Chandr6 Gould &
Marlene Burger, Trial Report: Fifteen, Mar. 6 - Mar. 9, 2000, at http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/cbw/cbw

40.
41.
42.
43.

See
See
See
See

index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).

BURGESS & PURITr, supra note 39, at 34-38.
id. at 17-25.
State v. Basson, 2004 (6) BCLR 620, 1 7 (CC).
id. 1 6.
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soil.4 4

The judge quashed these indictments on the basis that
the statute which criminalized conspiracies should be read restrictively so as not to cover conspiracies beyond South Africa's
borders.4 5 The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal
("SCA") against both the acquittal and the quashing of
charges.4 6 The appeal was rejected on a combination of procedural and substantive grounds.4 7

The State then applied to the Constitutional Court for leave
to appeal against the decision of the SCA.4" The trial record ran
to ten thousand pages, and the questions raised were varied and
complex. The Constitutional Court decided that it must have a
preliminary hearing as to whether these issues were of a constitutional nature or connected with a constitutional matter.4 9 If they
were not, the Constitutional Court would not have jurisdiction to
hear them.5 °
The Court decided after the preliminary hearing that there
were four issues that were indeed of a constitutional nature.
The first related to the refusal of the trial judge to allow the accused to be cross-examined on the basis of statements made during bail proceedings.5 2 The second concerned the refusal of the
judge to recuse himself on the grounds of his alleged bias.5 3
The third related to the question of double jeopardy, that is,
whether it would be unfair to try the accused a second time for
the offenses on which he had been acquitted.5 4 The fourth dealt
with the quashing of the charges and the possible relevance of
their being concerned with war crimes.5 5
The Court gave three separate judgments. 56 All were of a
preliminary nature. The majority opinion held that the State
44. See id. 5.
45. See id.
46. See id.
8-11.
47. See id.
12.
48. See id.
13-14.
49. See id.
15-16.
50. See id. 17.
51. See id.
52. See id. 27.
53. See id. 23.
54. See id. 61.
55. See id. 31.
56. See id., 2004 (6) BCLR 620,
1-82 (separate opinion of Ackermann, J.); see
also id., 2004 (6) BCLR 620,
83-109 (separate opinion of Chaskalson, J.); Id., 2004
(6) BCLR 620,
110-126 (separate opinion of Sachs, J.).

450

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOUIRNAL

[Vol. 28:432

had a general duty to prosecute crimes involving violation of the
right to protection of life and bodily integrity." This duty would
be especially strong if crimes against humanity or war crimes
were involved; a decision to quash charges of conspiracy to murder accordingly raised a constitutional question.5 8 The minority
judgment did not accept that questions in relation to the general
duty of the State to prosecute crimes involving the right to life
and bodily integrity were of a constitutional nature. It held,
however, that questions relating to the powers of a court on appeal were constitutional questions; the quashing of the charges
was a matter connected with these constitutional questions, and
as such could be heard by the Court.5" It left open the possible
relevance of war crimes. In a separate judgment I ventured a
little further than my colleagues had done.6 ' Dealing with the
potential legal significance of the conduct alleged to constitute a
war crime, I supported the majority judgment, and stated that
The questions before us have to be determined in the
complex historical and jurisprudential situation in which the
South African State had moved from perpetrating grave
breaches of international humanitarian law to providing constitutional protection against them. Issues which in another
context might appear to be purely technical concerning the
interpretation of a statute or the powers of a court on appeal,
took on profoundly constitutional dimensions in the context
of war crimes.
Nothing shows greater disrespect for the principles of
equality, human dignity and freedom than the clandestine
use of [S] tate power to murder and dispose of opponents. It
follows that any exercise of judicial power which has the effect of directly inhibiting the capacity of the [S] tate subsequently to secure accountability for such conduct goes to the
heart of South Africa's new constitutional order. When the
depredations complained of are of such a dimension as to
transgress the frontier between ordinary [S]tate-inspired
criminal violence and war crimes, the engagement with the
core of the Constitution becomes even more intense.
It is in this context that the interim Constitution pro57. See id.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

31-33.
37.
109-12.
84.
110-26.
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vided for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (the TRC). Its objective was to build a bridge
between the past and the present and enable an appropriate
balance to be achieved between all the public and private interests involved. The respondent has not chosen to have recourse to the TRC process. We are accordingly left to deal
with this matter on the basis of applying the ordinary principles of law and statutory interpretation as viewed and developed in the light of the Constitution.
The very enormity and intricacy of the legal issues requires that the analysis be undertaken with the utmost rigour
and dispassion. The need for objectivity is eloquently highlighted by Cassese in the
Preface to his seminal work on inter62
national criminal law:
"[O]ne should never forget that this body of law,
more than any other, results from a myriad of small
or great tragedies. Each crime is a tragedy, for the
victims and their relatives, the witnesses, the community to which they belong, and even the perpetrator, who, when brought to trial, will endure the
ordeal of criminal proceedings and, if found guilty,
may suffer greatly, in the form of deprivation of life,
at worst, or of personal liberty, at best. Law, it is well
known, filters and rarefies the halo of horror and
suffering surrounding crimes. As a consequence,
when one reads a law book or ajudgment, one is led
almost to forget the violent and cruel origin of criminal law prescriptions. One ought not to become
oblivious to it. To recall it may serve as a reminder
of the true historical source of criminal law. This
branch of law, more than any other, is about human
folly, human wickedness, and human aggressiveness.
It deals with the darkest side of our nature. It also
deals with how society confronts violence and viciousness and seeks to stem them as far as possible
so as 'to make gentle the life on this world'. Of
course the lawyer can do very little, for he is enjoined by his professional ethics neither to loathe
nor to pity human conduct. He is required to remain impassive and simply extract from the chaos of
conflicting standards of behaviour those that seem

62. See ANTONIO

CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw

xv-xvi (2003).
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63
to him to be imposed by law."

Cassese pointedly notes the tension between the tragedy
and suffering that victims of violent crimes and their communities endure and the comparatively sterile legal remedies judicial
systems impose. Cassese's views are especially instructive in this
case. In a different historical context this case would raise solely
technical questions of whether the statute criminalizing conspiracies covers extraterritorial conspiracies. However, while remaining cognizant of the necessity for objectivity in legal analysis, the detrimental impact that the trial court's decision would
have on the legal system the Constitution foresaw could not be
overlooked. I continued:
In the present case our country's relatively rapid transformation from predator [S] tate to protector [S]tate has intensified "the chaos of conflicting standards" to which Cassese
refers. The resolution of the conceptual tensions involved
can only be found in the Constitution and its values and in
the duty imposed on the [S]tate to protect those values. In a
fraught area like this it is particularly important to avoid
forms of consequential reasoning which lack a principled
foundation. The crucial question is not whether consequences influence reasoning but the nature of the consequences which may be involved. In my view, if the desire to
avoid potentially painful consequences results in the filling in
of gaps in legal reasoning, or places unacceptable strain on
principled legal logic, the integrity of the law is imperilled.
But if the consequences at issue relate to the constitutional
legal order itself or to rights protected by that order, they become integral to rather than destructive of rigorous legal
analysis. In the present case I believe the consequences of
the decision of the trial court to quash the charges, and the
subsequent refusal of the .. .SCA[ ] to entertain an appeal
against that decision, do impact directly on the legal order as
envisaged by the Constitution, particularly insofar as war
crimes may be involved. They touch on central features of
our constitutional democracy. As such they are determinative
of the issue before us at this stage, namely whether the questions raised in the application for leave to appeal, are constitutional matters.

I believe that three substantial, sequential and interre63. Basson, 2004 (6) BCLR 620,

111-14 (some citations omitted).
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lated constitutional questions arise in connection with the
quashing of the charges and the refusal of the SCA to entertain an appeal from the trial judge's decision. The first is
whether the conduct charged could be characterised as a war
crime as understood by international humanitarian law. If
the answer is affirmative, the second question is whether and
to what extent this could impose a special constitutional responsibility on the [S] tate to prosecute the respondent. The
third is whether the quashing of the charges by the trial court
followed by the refusal of the SCA to entertain an appeal
against this decision, without reference to the fact that the
prosecution of war crimes was involved, manifested a failure
to give effect to South Africa's international obligations as set
out in the Constitution.6 4
The judgment then went on to cite Cassese as stating that
war crimes could be perpetrated in the course of international
or internal armed conflicts, and identified two particularly serious charges against the accused in the batch that were
quashed. 65 The first alleged that to deal with overcrowding of
captives in detention facilities in Namibia, the accused had supplied asphyxiating and narcotic agents that had been fatally injected into about two hundred prisoners whose bodies then were
cast into the sea from an airplane.6 6 The second charge alleged
that the accused had furnished cholera bacteria to poison the
water supply of a refugee camp in order to manipulate the outcome of elections which were then pending in Namibia.6 7
The judgment then referred to Section 23268 of the Constitution which states: "Customary international law is law in the
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act
69
of Parliament.
The rules of humanitarian law constitute an important ingredient of customary international law. As the International
Court of Justice [("the ICJ")] has stated, they are fundamen64. Id.
115-16 (citations omitted).
65. Id.
117-20.
66. See Chandr Gould & Marlene Burger, Trial Report: Twenty, May 5 - May 11,
2000, at http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/cbw/cbwindex.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2005); see also Chandr6 Gould & Peter Folb, The South African Chemical and Biological
Warfare Program: An Overview, 7 NONPROLIFERATION REv. 10, 18 (2001).
67. See Gould & Folb, supra note 66, at 21.
68. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 14, § 232.
69. Basson, 2004 (6) BCLR 620,
122.

454

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:432

tal to the respect of the human person and "elementary considerations of humanity".7" The rules of humanitarian law in
armed conflicts are to be observed by all [S] tates whether or
not they have ratified the Conventions that contain them because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law. The ICJ has also stressed that the obligation on all governments to respect the Geneva Conventions
in all circumstances does not derive from the Conventions
themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expres71
sion.
The duty of [S] tates to provide effective penal sanctions
today for persons involved in grave breaches of humanitarian
law, whenever committed, is captured and expressed in Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (articles
146-147 appear with different numbering in all four conventions). It states: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to
enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined
in the following Article." Article 147 of the Geneva Convention goes on to indicate what sort of conduct would constitute
grave breaches of international humanitarian law. These include: "(A)ny of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health".7 2
It followed that the Court was entitled to hear the application for leave to appeal against the SCA's decision refusing to
entertain the appeal against the quashing of the charges by the
trial court, the constitutional issue being whether the SCA failed
to give sufficient or any weight to the State's obligations under
international law to prosecute war crimes or breaches of international humanitarian law.7 3
The judgment concluded, however, that
it should be emphasised that none of the above should be
taken as suggesting that because war crimes might be in70.
71.
72.
73.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [ 1996] I.C.J. 226, 257,
See id.
Basson, 2004 (6) BCLR 620, 1 122-23 (citations omitted).
See id. 125.

79.
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volved, the rights to a fair trial of the respondent as constitutionally protected are in any way attenuated. When allegations of such serious nature are at issue, and where the exemplary value of constitutionalism as against lawlessness is the
very issue at stake, it is particularly important that the judicial
and prosecutorial functions be undertaken with rigorous and
principled respect for basic constitutional rights. The effective prosecution of war crimes and the rights of the accused
to a fair trial are not antagonistic concepts. On the contrary,
both stem from the same constitutional and humanitarian
foundation, namely the need to uphold the rule of law and
the basic
principles of human dignity, equality and free74
dom.

III. MOHAMED
Mr. Mohamed, a Tanzanian national with refugee status,
was working quietly in Cape Town as a pastry chef. Unknown to
his employer he was being sought by the United States as a suspect on capital charges.7 5 These arose from the bombing in
1998 of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, where scores of
Tanzanians and Americans were killed.76 U.S. agents traced him
to Cape Town where he was living under an assumed name and
using a false passport.7 7 South African immigration authorities
arrested him as an illegal immigrant and thereafter handed him
over to the U.S. agents for immediate removal in a special plane
to the United States.7 ' His employer sought relief in the Cape
High Court. The South African government opposed.
The judgment began with a summary of the claims and procedural posture of the case:
The crux of the government's contentions, which carried
the day in the court below, was that Mohamed was an illegal
immigrant whom the immigration authorities had properly
decided to deport and whose deportation was mandated by
the [relevant] Act. Such deviations as there might have been
from the literal prescripts of the Act or the regulations were
of no legal consequence. Nor did the collaboration between
74.
75.
(CC).
76.
77.
78.

Id. 126.
See Mohamed v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 2001 (7) BCLR 685,
See id.
See id.
See id.

44.

9
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the South African officials and the FBI agents whereby
Mohamed was eventually removed to the United States make
any difference to his status or his liability to deportation.
Moreover, so the court held, on the evidence of the immigration officials, which could not be rejected in motion proceedings, Mohamed had been duly apprised of his rights and had
freely elected to accompany the FBI officers without delay to
the United States, there to stand trial with his comrades. Finally, so the government contended and the court found, a
court had no power to issue the mandamus sought, which
would in any event have no efficacy. On 20 April 2001 the
High Court delivered its judgment, comprehensively dismissing the contentions advanced on behalf of the applicants
and refusing the relief they had sought.
As had been the case in the High Court, much of the
argument in this appeal was directed to the question whether
the removal of Mohamed to the United States was a deportation or a disguised extradition. The distinction was said to be
this. If he was deported that would have been a lawful act on
the part of the South African government. The fact that
Mohamed was to be "deported" to the United States where he
would immediately be put on trial for an offence that carried
the death penalty was not relevant. There is nothing in our
Constitution that precluded the government from deporting
an undesirable alien, or that required it to secure an assurance from the United States government that the death sentence would not be imposed on Mohamed if he were to be
convicted. If, however, what happened was in substance an
extradition, it would have been unlawful because the correct
procedures were not followed. Moreover, if the removal had
been effected by way of extradition, it might have been necessary to secure an assurance from the United States government as a condition of the extradition that the death sentence would not be imposed.
Deportation and extradition serve different purposes.
Deportation is directed to the removal from a [S]tate of an
alien who has no permission to be there. Extradition is the
handing over by one [S]tate to another [S]tate of a person
convicted or accused there of a crime, with the purpose of
enabling the receiving [S] tate to deal with such person in accordance with the provisions of its law. The purposes may,
however, coincide where an illegal alien is "deported" to another country which wants to put him on trial for having com-
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mitted a criminal offence the prosecution of which falls
within the jurisdiction of its courts.
Deportation is usually a unilateral act while extradition is
consensual. Different procedures are prescribed for deportation and extradition, and those differences may be material
in specific cases, particularly where the legality of the expulsion is challenged. In the circumstances of the present case,
however, the distinction is not relevant. The procedure followed in removing Mohamed to the United States of America
was unlawful whether it is characterised as a deportation or
an extradition. Moreover, an obligation on the South African
government to secure an assurance that the death penalty will
not be imposed on a person whom it causes to be removed
from South Africa to another country cannot depend
on
79
whether the removal is by extradition or deportation.
The Court thus rejected the government's argument that it
had a right to deport Mohamed, and that any obligations to him
ended at his transfer."0 It continued by holding that while the
Government may have a general right to deport undesirable
aliens, it was derelict not only in its handling of the deportation
procedure, but also in failing to fulfill its obligation to obtain
assurance from the United States that Mohamed would not be
sentenced to death:
Mohamed entered South Africa under an assumed name
using a false passport. He applied for asylum giving false information in support of his application and was issued with a
temporary visa to enable him to remain in South Africa while
his application was being considered. Those facts justified
the South African government in deporting him. That, however, is only part of the story, for the crucial events are those
that happened after Mohamed had secured his temporary
visa. Having been identified by the FBI as a suspect for whom
an international arrest warrant had been issued in connection with the bombing of the United States embassy in
Tanzania, he was apprehended by the South African immigration authorities in a joint operation undertaken in cooperation with the FBI. Within two days of his arrest and contrary
to the provisions of the Act he was handed over to the FBI by
79. Id.
6, 41-43.
80. Id.
6 (summarizing the government's contentions, which include that any
violation of South African law regarding deportation procedures was of "no legal consequence").
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the South African authorities for the purpose of being taken
to the United States to be put on trial there for the bombing
of the embassy. On his arrival in the United States he was
immediately charged with various offences relating to that
bombing and was informed by the court that the death sentence could be imposed on him if he were convicted. That
this was likely to happen must have been apparent to the
South African authorities as well as to the FBI when the arrangements were made for Mohamed to be removed from
South Africa to the United States.
Another suspect, Mr Mahmoud Mahmud Salim, alleged
to be a party to the conspiracy to bomb the embassies, was
extradited from Germany to the United States. Germany has
abolished capital punishment and is also party to the European Convention on Human Rights. The German government sought and secured an assurance from the United
States government as a condition of the extradition that if he
is convicted, Salim will not be sentenced to death. This is
consistent with the practice 81followed by countries that have
abolished the death penalty.
The judgment continued:
by committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to give particular value
to the rights to life and dignity, and that "this must be demonstrated by the State in everything that it does". 82 In handing
Mohamed over to the United States without securing an assurance that he would not be sentenced to death, the immigration authorities failed to give any value to Mohamed's
right to life, his right to have his human dignity respected and
protected and his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment.8"
The Court underlined the positive obligation that the Bill of
Rights imposed on the State to "protect promote and fulfil the
rights in the Bill of Rights."8 4 It then proceeded to hold that:
For the South African government to cooperate with a foreign government to secure the removal of a fugitive from
South Africa to a country of which the fugitive is not a national and with which he has no connection other than that
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
44-45.
State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665,
Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685, 49.
Id. 1 59.

144 (CC).
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he is to be put on trial for his life there, is contrary to the
underlying values of our Constitution. It is inconsistent with
the government's obligation to protect the right to life of everyone in South Africa, and it ignores the commitment implicit in the Constitution that South Africa will not be party to
the imposition of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
...The handing over of Mohamed to the United States
government agents for removal by them to the United States
was unlawful.
That is a serious finding. South Africa is a young democracy still finding its way to full compliance with the values and
ideals enshrined in the Constitution. It is therefore important that the [I] tate lead by example. This principle cannot
be put better than in the celebrated words ofJustice Brandeis
in Olmstead et al v United States: "In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously .. .Government is the potent,
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example .. .If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."8 5 The warning was given in a distant era but remains as cogent as ever.
Indeed, for us in this country, it has a particular relevance:
we saw in the past what happens when the [S] tate bends the
law to its own ends and now, in the new era of constitutionality, we may be tempted to use questionable measures in the
war against crime. The lesson becomes particularly important when dealing with those who aim to destroy the system of
government through law by means of organised violence.
The legitimacy of the constitutional order is undermined
rather than reinforced when the [S]tate acts unlawfully.
Here South African government agents acted inconsistently
with the Constitution in handing over Mohamed without an
assurance that he would not be executed and in relying on
consent obtained from a person who was not fully aware of
his rights and was moreover deprived of the benefit of legal
advice. They also acted inconsistently with statute in unduly
accelerating deportation and then despatching Mohamed 8 to
6
a country to which they were not authorised to send him.
During the hearing of argument there had been considera85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
86. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685,
59, 68-69.
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ble debate as to whether any purpose would be served by the
Court making a declaratory order. The Court described the argument and then rejected it:
In substance the stance was that Mohamed had been irreversibly surrendered to the power of the United States and, in any
event, it was not for this Court, or any other, to give instructions to the executive.
We disagree. It would not necessarily be futile for this
Court to pronounce on the illegality of the governmental
conduct in issue in this case. In the first instance, quite apart
from the particular interest of the applicants in this case,
there are important issues of legality and policy involved and
it is necessary that we say plainly what our conclusions as to
those issues are. And as far as the particular interests of
Mohamed are concerned, we are satisfied that it is desirable
that our views to be appropriately conveyed to the trial court.
Not only is the learned judge presiding aware of these proceedings, s 7 but the very reason why they were instituted by
the applicants was said to be that our findings may have a
bearing on the case over which he is presiding. On the papers there is a conflict of opinion as between one of the defence lawyers on the one hand and a member of the prosecution team on the other, both of whom have filed affidavits
expressing their respective views as to the admissibility and/
or cogency in the criminal proceedings of any finding we
might make. It is for the presiding judge to determine such
issues. For that purpose he may or may not wish to have regard to disputed material such as our findings. It is therefore
incumbent on this Court to ensure as best it can that the trial
judge is enabled to exercise his judicial powers in relation to
the proceedings in this Court; and an appropriate order to
that end will be made.
Nor would it necessarily be out of place for there to be
an appropriate order on the relevant organs of [S]tate in
South Africa to do whatever may be within their power to
remedy the wrong here done to Mohamed by their actions, or
to ameliorate at best the consequential prejudice caused to
him. To stigmatise such an order as a breach of the separation of [S]tate power as between the executive and the judiciary is to negate a foundational value of the Republic of South
Africa, namely supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of
87. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.

2005] WAR, VIOLENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE OVERLAP461
law. The Bill of Rights, which we find to have been infringed,
is binding on all organs of [S] tate and it is our constitutional
duty to ensure that appropriate relief is afforded to those who
have suffered infringement of their constitutional rights. On
the facts of the present case, however, and bearing in mind
the advanced [S]tate of the proceedings in New York, we believe that the most 88appropriate and effective order is the one
that follows below.
The Court in fact instructed its Director to deliver a full text
of the judgment to the Federal Court for the Southern District
of New York as a matter of urgency.8 9
Postscript
There was apparently considerable debate in the U.S. Federal Court as to whether the jury should be made aware of the
judgment. ° Mr. Mohamed had already been found guilty as
charged, and the question was whether anything in our judgment had a bearing on the decision the jury was due to make in
a separate hearing on whether the death sentence should be imposed. The defense alleged many mitigating factors during the
sentencing process. 91 One was that he was only twenty-five years
old when he committed the bombing.9 2 To the best of my recollection, seven of the twelve members of the jury voted against
the death sentence, citing an unwillingness to make him a martyr.9 3 More important to me was another mitigating factor cited
by the defense, alleging that it would be unfair to treat Mr.
Mohamed in a more serious fashion than his co-accused from
Germany, who had been extradited on the United States' agreement that he would not be executed.9 4
This illustrates a broader principle of equal treatment that
should apply not only as between individuals but in respect of
88. See Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685,
70-72 (some citations omitted).
89. Id. 74.
90. See United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
91. Trial Transcript at 7443, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d
359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 98-1023).
92. Id. at 7444.
93. See Benjamin Weiser, Jury Rejects Death Penalty for Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2001, at B1.
94. Trial Transcript at 7443-44, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d
359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 98-1023).

462

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNTAL

[Vol. 28:432

Nations. Though social conditions may vary between countries,
the principles of the rule of law are the same all over the world.
There can be no justification for respecting due process in relation to a country of the North, and not respecting it when dealing with a country of the South. It was disconcerting during argument to hear that officials in the United States had coined the
term "informal rendition" to cover the handing over of suspects
in certain parts of the world. The law is the law, is the law, is the
law. When the very issue at stake is the integrity of the international legal order, it is particularly important that respect for all
its principles be maintained.
It may be easy to proclaim the virtues of the rule of law for
other countries when your own is not under threat. The true
test of a national commitment to a Nation's deepest moral principles only comes when the Nation itself is placed under pressure. I should mention, however, that at the time when the
Mohamed case was being heard, South Africa was not immune to
bomb blasts and death, though now things are quiet.
Undoubtedly, law enforcement agents throughout the
world, wherever they are, must be on guard to deal with deeds of
orchestrated terrorism, and to act with resolution to capture and
punish those responsible. Yet due resolve and due process are
not contradictory. The ultimate victory of democracy and the
rule of law will be achieved by enlarging, rather than narrowing,
the gap between the values and methods of those engaged in
terrorist acts and those who defend the rule of law. The difference between the two world views should never be reduced simply to establishing who has the greatest command of physical
force or who can shout the loudest. In the words of a great
judge, "the law is not silent amidst the clash of arms."9 5 It may
well have to adapt itself in a principled manner to new experiences, but its voice should always rise clearly and unmistakably
above the din.

95. Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) and (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), [1992] I.C.J. 114, 180 (dissenting opinion of Weeramantry, J.) (crediting a
judge with modifying Cicero's saying that "[l]aws are silent amidst the clash of arms.").
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IV. KAUNDA
People plotting coups in other countries do not arrange
their affairs to take account of court recesses. Judges read newspapers and watch television, so we could see what came to be
known as the "mercenaries" case looming large and about to
reach our Court in the middle of our winter break.9 6 The matter
was clearly urgent.9 7
The applicants were arrested in Zimbabwe on 7 March
2004. On 9 March 2004, a group of 15 men were arrested in
Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, and accused of being mercenaries and plotting a coup against the President of
Equatorial Guinea. The majority of the detainees are South
African nationals. The applicants fear that they may be extradited from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea and put on trial
with those who have been arrested there. They contend that
if this happens they will not get a fair trial and, if convicted,
that they stand the risk of being sentenced to death.
The applicants primarily aim to avoid being extradited to
Equatorial Guinea and being tried in Zimbabwe or Equatorial
Guinea. To that end their first claim is to require the South
African government to take steps to have them extradited to
South Africa so that any trial they may have to face can be
conducted here. The other claims are directed to their conditions of detention, and to trial procedures should they be
put on trial in Zimbabwe or Equatorial Guinea.
A theme that runs through all the claims is a demand
that the government should seek assurances from foreign
governments concerning prosecutions or contemplated prosecutions in those countries. The applicants assert that they
have rights under the Constitution entitling them to make
such demands, that the government has failed to comply with
their demands and that in failing to do so it has breached
their constitutional rights. The relief they claim is in effect a
mandamus ordering the government to take action at a diplomatic level to ensure that the rights they claim to have under
the South African Constitution are respected by the two foreign governments.
96. See Kaunda v. President of Republic of S. Mr., 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
(CC).
97. See id.

7-8
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The issues raised by the applicants and the amicus curiae
involve, on the one hand, the relationship at an international
level between South Africa and foreign [S] tates, in this case
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea, and on the other, the nature and extent of its obligations to citizens beyond its borders. To answer the questions raised it is necessary
to deal
98
both with international law and domestic law.
The case was first heard in the Transvaal High Court, where
on June 9, 2004, all the claims were dismissed.9 9 Application was
then made for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court, and
in view of the urgency, was set down for hearing in the middle of
the Court recess.' 0 0 Ten of the eleven members of the Court
were able to hear oral argument on July 19-20. l1o Working
nights and weekends, we delivered judgment fifteen days later.
10 2
In fact, we produced four different judgments.
Although all the Judges agreed on the main thrust of the
decision, there were some significant differences on particular
aspects. Five Judges concurred without qualification in the principal judgment written by the Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson.
Justice Sandile Ngcobo concurred with substantial amplification103 and I concurred in a short judgment I wrote. 10 4 Justice
Kate O'Regan wrote a judgment which agreed in large part with
that of the Chief Justice, but differed in relation to the order to
be made." 5
A. The Right to Diplomatic Protection
The majority judgment began with an analysis of international law principles concerning diplomatic protection. Did international law require the South African government to provide
diplomatic protection to the alleged mercenaries? The judgment noted that Section 232 of the Constitution 10 6 provides that:
"Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is
98. Id.
2, 17, 21-22.
99. See id.
3-5.
100. See id. 5.
101. A quorum is eight. See S. AiR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(2).
102. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
103. See Kaunda, 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
146-211.
104. See id.
272-75.
105. See id. 1 212-71.
106. S. AwR. CONST. ch. 14, § 232. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

2005] WAR, VIOLENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE OVERLAP465
10 7
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.
The Court then stated that, traditionally, international law
has acknowledged that States had the right to protect their nationals beyond their borders, but were under no obligation to do
so.'0 8 The applicants suggested that the traditional approach to
diplomatic protection should be developed to recognize that in
certain circumstances where injury is the result of a grave breach
of an internationally accepted norm, such as that set out in the
Barcelona Traction"°9 case, the State whose national has been injured should have a legal duty to exercise diplomatic protection
on behalf of the injured person. 1 0° The prevailing view, however, was that diplomatic protection is not recognized by international law as a human right and cannot be enforced as such."'
To do so may give rise to more problems than it would solve, so
diplomatic protection remains the prerogative of the State to be
exercised at its discretion. The Court held, therefore, that the
applicants could not base their claims on customary interna12
tional law.'
The next question was whether the South African Constitution could be construed as having extraterritorial effect. Did
protections offered by the Bill of Rights extend to South Africans
in adverse circumstances beyond the country's borders? Section
233 of the Constitution 1 3 provided: "When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international
law.""' 4 Section 233 applies equally to the provisions of the Bill
of Rights and the Constitution as a whole, therefore, the Constitution requires courts to consider international law when inter107. Kaunda, 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
23.
108. See id.
109. Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, [1970] I.C.J. 3, 44,
78. The traditional approach used in the Barcelona Traction case is a liberal standard for
defining when diplomatic protection should be exercised by a State. In Barcelona Traction, the International Court of Justice indicated that a State can exercise diplomatic
protection "by whatever means and to whatever extent it sees fit," as long as it acts
within the prescribed limits of international law, the rationale being that it is the State's
own right that is being exercised. Id. 78.
110. See Kaunda, 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
28.
111. See id. 29.
112. See id.; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113. S.AFR. CONST. ch. 14, § 233.
114. Kaunda, 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
33.
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preting the Bill of Rights.1 15
The Court could find no international law granting the
rights the applicants claimed:
A right to diplomatic protection is not referred to in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor is it a right contained in any international agreement of which [the Chief
Justice is] aware, including the international human rights'
treaties to which South Africa is a party ....
Foreigners are entitled to require the South African
[S]tate to respect, protect and promote their rights to life
and dignity and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way while they are in South Africa.
Clearly, they lose the benefit of that protection when they
move beyond our borders.1 16

B. ExtraterritorialEffect
Did South Africa's Bill Of Rights have extraterritorial effect?
It is a general rule of international law that the laws of a
[S]tate ordinarily apply only within its own territory. 117 It is
recognised, however, that a [S] tate is also entitled, in certain
circumstances, to make laws binding on nationals wherever
they may be....
... For South Africa to assume an obligation that entitles
its nationals to demand, and obliges it to take action to ensure, that laws and conduct of a foreign [S]tate and its officials meet not only the requirements of the foreign [S]tate's
own laws, but also the rights that our nationals have under
our Constitution, would be inconsistent with the principle of
[S] tate sovereignty....
During argument hypothetical questions were raised relating to South African officials abroad, to South African companies doing business beyond our borders, to the government itself engaging in commercial ventures through [S] tate
owned companies with bases in foreign countries, and to
what the [S] tate's obligations might be in such circumstances.
There is a difference between an extraterritorial infringe-

115. See id.
116. Id.
34, 36.
117. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES

OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw

287-89 (6th ed. 2003).
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ment of a constitutional right by an organ of [S]tate ... in
circumstances which do not infringe the sovereignty of a foreign [S] tate, and an obligation on our government to take
action in a foreign [S] tate that interferes directly or indirectly
with the sovereignty of that [S] tate. Claims that fall in the
former category raise problems with which it is not necessary
to deal .... They may, however, be justiciable in our courts,
and nothing in this judgment should be construed as exclud11 8
ing that possibility.
The Mohamed case had been extensively debated during the
oral argument. The applicants there had contended that because the South African government had supplied the intelligence which led to their arrests, the government had a particular duty to protect them. 119
The facts of the present case are entirely different. The
applicants were not removed from South Africa by the government, or with the government's assistance. They left
South Africa voluntarily and now find themselves in difficulty
in Zimbabwe and at risk of being extradited to Equatorial
Guinea. Their arrest in Zimbabwe, the criminal charges
brought against them there, and the possibility of their being
extradited from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea are not the
result of any unlawful conduct on the part of the government
or of the breach of any duty it owed to them.
Police who receive information that a bank robbery is being planned do not commit a wrong by failing to advise the
would be robbers of the information that they have, nor do
they act illegally by lying in wait at the site of the proposed
robbery in order to apprehend the robbers when they arrive
at the scene. For a court to hold otherwise would undermine
legitimate methods of policing and law enforcement.
Even if the intelligence passed on by South Africa to
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea led to the arrests in
Zimbabwe, the passing on of the intelligence was not a wrongful act. In the times in which we live it is essential that this be
done, and comity between [N]ations would be harmed by a
failure to do so. No wrong has been done to the applicants
by the South African government that has to be remedied,
118. Kaunda, 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
119. See id. 46.

38, 44-45.
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nor is there a consequence of unlawful conduct that has to be
ameliorated.
In the present case the actors responsible for the action
against which the applicants demand protection from the
South African government are all actors in the employ of sovereign [S]tates over whom our government has no control.
The laws to which objection is taken are the laws of foreign
[S]tates who are entitled to demand that they be respected by
everyone within their territorial jurisdiction, and also by
other [S]tates. The applicants have no right to demand that
the government take action to prevent those laws being ap20
plied to them.

C. Rights of the Citizen
The judgment addressed the issue of whether the government could be forced by its citizens to intercede diplomatically
on their behalf by turning to the Constitution:
This does not mean that our Constitution is silent on
[the issue of whether the government could be called upon
to act.] Section 3 of the Constitution1 21 provides:
"(1) There is a common South African citizenship.
(2) All citizens are(a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and
(b) equally subject to the duties and responsibilities
of citizenship.
(3) National legislation must provide for the acquisition, loss and restoration of citizenship."
As a [N]ation we have committed ourselves to uphold
and protect fundamental rights which are the cornerstone of
our democracy. We recognise a common citizenship and that
all citizens are equally entitled to the rights, privileges and
benefits of citizenship. Whilst I have held that there is no
enforceable right to diplomatic protection, South African citizens are entitled to request South Africa for protection under
international law against wrongful acts of a foreign [S]tate.
They are not in a position to invoke international law
themselves and are obliged to seek protection through the
120. Id.
50-51, 53, 57.
121. S. AnR. CONST. ch. 1, § 3.
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[S]tate of which they are nationals. Whilst the [S]tate is entifled but not obliged under international law to take such action, it invariably acts only if requested by the national to do
SO.
When the request is directed to a material infringement
of a human right that forms part of customary international
law, one would not expect our government to be passive.
Whatever theoretical disputes may still exist about the basis
for diplomatic protection, it cannot be doubted that in substance the true beneficiary of the right that is asserted is the
individual.
The founding values of our Constitution include human
dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms. Equality is reflected in the principle of equal citizenship demanded by section 3.
The advancement of human rights and freedoms is central to the Constitution itself. It is a thread that runs throughout the Constitution and informs the manner in which government is required to exercise its powers. To this extent, the
provisions of [the Bill of Rights] are relevant, not as giving our Constitution extraterritorialeffect, but as showing that our Constitution
contemplates that government 1will
act positively to protect its citizens
22
against human rights abuses.
The majority judgment went on to hold that if citizens have
a right to request the government to provide them with diplomatic protection, then the government must have a corresponding obligation to consider the request and deal with it consistently with the Constitution.1 2 3 There might even be a duty in
extreme cases for the government on its own initiative to provide
assistance to its nationals against egregious breaches of interna124
tional human rights which come to its knowledge.
The judgment concludes that:
There may thus be a duty on government, consistent
with its obligations under international law, to take action to
protect one of its citizens against a gross abuse of international human rights norms. A request to the government for
assistance in such circumstances where the evidence is clear
122. Kaunda, 2004 (10) BCLR 1009,
citations omitted).

123. See id.
124. See id.

67.

58, 60-61, 64-66 (emphasis added) (some
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would be difficult, and in extreme cases possibly impossible to
refuse. It is unlikely that such a request would ever be refused by government, but if it were, the decision would be
justiciable, and a court
could order the government to take
25
appropriate action.'
D. Discretion of Government
At the same time it was necessary to stress that a decision as
to whether - and if so, what - protection should be given was
an aspect of external policy which was essentially the function of
the executive:
The timing of representations if they are to be made, the language in which they should be couched, and the sanctions (if
any) which should follow if such representations are rejected
are matters with which courts are ill equipped to deal. The
best way to secure relief for the national in whose interest the
action is taken may be to engage in delicate and sensitive negotiations in which diplomats are better placed to make decisions than judges, and which could be harmed by court proceedings and the attendant publicity.
This does not mean that South African courts have no
jurisdiction to deal with issues concerned with diplomatic
protection. The exercise of all public power is subject to constitutional control. Thus even decisions by the President to
grant a pardon or to appoint a commission of inquiry are justiciable. This also applies to an allegation that government
has failed to respond appropriately to a request for diplomatic protection.
For instance if the decision were to be irrational, a court
could intervene. This does not mean that courts would substitute their opinion for that of the government or order the
government to provide a particular form of diplomatic protection. ...
If government refuses to consider a legitimate request,
or deals with it in bad faith or irrationally, a court could require government to deal with the matter properly. Rationality and bad faith are illustrations of grounds on which a court
may be persuaded to review a decision. There may possibly
be other grounds as well and these illustrations should not be
understood as a closed list.
125. Id.

69.
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What needs to be stressed, however, in the light of some
of the submissions made to us in this case, is that government
has a broad discretion 6in such matters which must be
12
respected by our courts.
E. Capital Punishment
The majority judgment then turned to the question of the
applicants possibly being charged with capital offenses in Equatorial Guinea:
There can be no doubt that capital punishment is inconsistent with the provisions of our Bill of Rights. But the question whether South African citizens can require our government to take action to protect them against conduct in a foreign country, which would be lawful there, but would infringe
their rights if committed in South Africa, raises entirely different issues. Although the abolitionist movement is growing
stronger at an international level, capital punishment is not
prohibited by the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and is still not impermissible under international law.
The execution of the sentence, if imposed, would be by the
[SI tate of Equatorial Guinea, which means that attempts to
mitigate the sentence would necessarily engage the foreign
relations between the two countries.
The government's policy on this issue is that it makes
representations concerning the imposition of such punishment only if and when such punishment is imposed on a
South African citizen ....
The applicants are entitled to the
benefit of this policy, and if capital punishment were to be
imposed on them, then consistently with its policy, government would have to make representations on their behalf.
There is no evidence to suggest that this would not happen.

12 7

F. Right to a Fair Trial
The next question related to the claims by the applicants
that they would not receive a fair trial in Equatorial Guinea.12 8
The judgment said that grave allegations concerning the justice
126. Id.
77-80 (citations omitted).
127. Id.
98-99 (citations omitted).
128. See id. 116.
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system in that country called for close scrutiny and careful consideration by the Court. 1 29 They were based on reports of Amnesty International, the International Bar Association and a Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights which covered a period from January 1999 to March
2004.130 The judgment gave details from these reports and
stated that the South African government policy was not to comment on the justice systems in other countries. 3 ' It took the
attitude that the reports were not admissible in evidence and
that the Court could not make a finding on the efficacy and fairness of the legal and judicial systems of Equatorial Guinea with1 32
out the benefit of expert evidence.
The majority judgment accepted that it could not and
should not make such a finding on the basis only of the reports. 13 3 Yet it could not ignore the seriousness of allegations
made after investigations by reputable international organizations and the Special Rapporteur. If the reports were accurate,
there would be serious concern about the fairness of the trial the
applicants could face. 3

The judgment went on to highlight that competing considerations had to be taken into account:
The history of coups and counter coups in Africa has undermined democracy on the continent. Such practices are
the antithesis of the foreign policy principles of the South African government. These principles and the priorities of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs are referred to in the evidence.
They include a commitment to justice and international law
in the conduct of relations between [N]ations, a commitment
to interact with African partners as equals, and a commitment
to the promotion of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, described as "a continental instrument to advance
people-centred development based on democratic values and
principles." It would be a breach of South Africa's duty to
Equatorial Guinea, and its international obligations, in particular to other African [S] tates, to frustrate a criminal prosecu129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
117-21.
id. 122.
id.
id.
id. at 124.
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tion instituted there simply because the accused persons are
South African nationals.
On the other hand, if the allegations by the applicants
that they will not get a fair trial in Equatorial Guinea prove to
be correct, and they are convicted and sentenced to death,
there will have been a grave breach of international law harmful to our government's foreign policy and its aspirations for
a democratic Africa. As far as the applicants are concerned
the consequences would be catastrophic, and they will have
suffered irreparable harm.
The applicants are not in Equatorial Guinea and they
have not been put on trial there. No injury has been done to
them by that country and no injury will be done unless they
are put on trial there; nor will any wrong be done if they are
put on trial and the proceedings are conducted fairly. To this
extent the claim for protection is premature. It cannot, however, be said that there is not a risk that the consequences
that the applicants fear will happen. Should that risk become
a reality the government would be obliged to respond positively. Given its stated foreign policy, there is no reason to
believe that this will not be done.
It is also relevant to have regard to the limited power that
the government has under international law to affect decisions of a foreign [S]tate. It is essentially a power of persuasion, and it is for this reason that courts everywhere are reluctant to intervene in such matters, even if, as in Germany, they
have the power to do so. ...
The situation which exists in the present case is one
which calls for delicate negotiations to ensure that if reasonably possible the fears that the applicants entertain can be put
to rest, and that the trial, if one takes place, is conducted in a
way that meets internationally accepted standards. The assessment of the risk, the best way of avoiding it and the timing
of action are essentially matters within the domain of government.
The applicants have not established that the government breached or threatened to breach35any duty it has under
1
the Constitution or international law.
...

In the summary of its conclusions, the Court referred to the
135. Id. 1 125-27, 130-31, 133 (citations omitted).
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fact that stated government policy concerning the conditions of
detention and the conduct of trials of nationals in other countries was to ensure that all South African citizens were detained
in accordance with international law standards, had access to
their lawyers and received a fair trial. This policy adopted by
South Africa in its relations with other States was not inconsistent with international law or any 6obligation that the govern13
ment has under the Constitution.
Both the judgments of Justice Ngcobo and Justice O'Regan
highlighted the importance of evolving principles of international law emphasizing the duty of States to protect fundamental
human rights.1" 7 In my view their main thrust was to give added
texture to the majority judgment without contradicting its basic
line of argument.1 3 ' Each contained what I regarded as elegantly phrased and powerfully reasoned passages highlighting
South Africa's obligation as a State to promote respect for basic
human rights at an international level, particularly in relation to
guaranteeing respect for the right not to be subjected to torture
and to have a fair trial. I did not agree with Justice O'Regan that
the government had failed to show sufficient willingness to meet
with its international human rights law obligations in respect of
the applicants. Save for this one aspect, I found myself in agreement with her judgment as well as the equally eloquent judgment of Justice Ngcobo. I have read few better expositions of
the evolution of international human rights law in recent decades, and wished to associate myself with the sentiments they
expressed.
In expressing my concurrence in the main judgment and
support for the additional texture provided by the separate judgments, I pointed out that the South African Constitution made it
clear that one of the principles governing national security was
"The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes
any South African citizen from participating in
armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except
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terms of the Constitution or national legislation."
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through military coups violated this principle in a most
profound way. The government was under a duty to act resolutely to combat them, the more so if they were hatched on
South African soil.
At the same time, [the Constitution] provides that: "The
security services must act, and must teach and require their
members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the
law, including customary international law and international
agreements binding on the Republic."1 4 This section emphasises that in dealing with even the most serious threats to
the [S] tate, a noble end does not justify the use of base
means....
The values of our Constitution and the human rights
principles enshrined in international law are mutually reinforcing, interrelated and, where they overlap, indivisible.
South Africa owes much of its very existence to the rejection
of apartheid by the organised international community and
the latter's concern for the upholding of fundamental human
rights. It would be a strange interpretation of our Constitution that suggested that adherence by the government in any
of its activities to the foundational norms that paved the way
to its creation was merely an option and not a duty."'
G. Postscript

At one stage during argument I stated to counsel for the
applicants, perhaps incautiously, that people who venture into a
lion's den should not be surprised if they find a lion. The press
picked up the observation and there was even a cartoon based
on it. The exchange with counsel is part of the rough and tumble of legal life and an important way of getting to legal truth.
But in the end, we judges are accountable through the judgments we deliver, and not the questions we ask.
It is difficult to analyze the impact that court cases have on
actual historical events. It may well be that the public scrutiny of
the case, and the evidence and arguments presented in it, had
more impact on national life than did the actual decision. Any
amount of forensic combat, however bitter and prolonged, is
better than a single bullet.
Submitting the harsh conflicts of our times to legal scrutiny
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- conducted transparently and in the light of internationally
accepted values of fairness and justice - was a telling rebuttal of
mercenarism and violence, whether from or against the State. It
responded in an instrumental way to the immediate issues, and
at the same time it induced governments, judiciaries, and law
enforcement agencies in three countries to engage with each
other and to carefully consider their powers and responsibilities
under international law. It reaffirmed to the South African public that we are living in a constitutional democracy in which all
exercises of power are subject to constitutional control. It said
something important about the kind of country in which we live
and about the importance of principled and reasoned debate. It
underlined that we have moved from a culture of authority and
submission to the law to one ofjustification and rights under the
law.
Having pronounced as judges as well as we can, we go back
to reading the press and watching television, like everybody else.
Thus, it was through the media that we learned subsequently
that the applicants had been sentenced under Zimbabwean law
to terms of imprisonment, if I remember correctly, of about one
year each, with their leader getting seven years. 14 2 At a later date
most of the accused on trial in Equatorial Guinea were found
guilty of plotting a coup. 143 The prosecution asked for the death
sentence in some cases. 1 4 The stiffest sentence was that of
1 45
thirty-four years imprisonment.
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